When we search for ransomware samples during an investigation or detection test, we usually want to answer a direct question: Did this file actually encrypt user documents when executed?
Modern ransomware families implement file encryption in many different ways. While commodity builders may call standard operating system cryptographic APIs, contemporary Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) payloads written in Rust, Go, C++, or .NET frequently embed statically linked AES, ChaCha20-Poly1305, RSA, or custom intermittent encryption routines that never touch OS crypto libraries. At the same time, benign installers, browsers, and updaters legitimately use cryptography and write thousands of temporary files during normal execution.
This week, we rolled out three updates across VirusTotal and Google Threat Intelligence to identify malware that encrypts user files:
- New
encrypts-filesTag Across Windows and macOS Sandboxes: A cipher-agnostic behavioral trait (behaviour_tags:encrypts_files) and file-level search tag (tag:encrypts-files) emitted across CAPE Sandbox, Zenbox, and macOS Mirage only when dynamic analysis confirms real encryption of user documents. - Stricter MITRE ATT&CK
T1486Gating in CAPE Sandbox: Previously, generic CAPE file-churn signatures mapped high-volume file deletes, overwrites, or moves directly toT1486. Newly scanned CAPE reports now require verified user-file encryption before emitting those T1486 mappings, cutting CAPE-only daily T1486 hits from 1,039/day (78.5% with 0 AV detections) to 0 on benign files and reducing false positives across platform-wide T1486 volume by 97.6% (from 7,238 to 171 files per day). - Real-Time VirusTotal Livehunt Support: Real-time YARA-X matching on sandbox reports via
vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES.
tag:encrypts-files and gating CAPE T1486.How Cipher-Agnostic File-Encryption Verification Works
Across CAPE Sandbox (Windows), Zenbox (Windows), and macOS Mirage (Apple Silicon), each sandbox environment contains realistic user documents across standard user profile directories.
During and after detonation, our sandboxes apply three verification gates before emitting encrypts-files (and before CAPE emits generic T1486 mappings):
- Content Destruction and Entropy Verification (Cipher-Agnostic): Rather than hooking OS cryptographic APIs, each sandbox inspects modified user-file content on disk using format-aware verification tailored to its platform. Depending on the file type and sandbox, checks evaluate destroyed file structures, elevated entropy, or non-text byte patterns alongside corroborating ransomware behaviors without relying on a single fixed entropy threshold. Because verification evaluates the resulting files on disk, it catches AES, ChaCha20, intermittent encryption, and XOR ciphers alike.
- Coordinated Ransomware Extension Renames: Many ransomware families read original user documents, write encrypted copies under a uniform new extension (for example,
.k404,.lkd,.INC,.BLWZ, or.heartbreaker), and delete the originals. Our sandboxes correlate reads, writes, moves, and unlinks across user directories to confirm coordinated encryption renames across user documents. - Benign File-Churn Exclusion Guards: Self-extracting archives, software installers, compilers, browser caches, and logs are explicitly excluded when they only generate routine temporary or application files rather than encrypting user documents. Similarly, dropping a
README.txtfile or calling crypto APIs alone never triggersencrypts-fileswithout corroborated document encryption.
Real-World Ransomware Caught in Action
Across 328,257 newly submitted unique files (405,469 total files including rescans) analyzed in CAPE Sandbox, Zenbox, and macOS Mirage since November 17, tag:encrypts-files matched 55 files and surfaced in-the-wild and validation payloads across Windows executables, Python scripts, DLLs, compressed archives (ZIP and RAR), and a rescanned Apple Silicon macOS binary with zero benign software false positives across all 55 manually reviewed matches (alongside 0 benign false positives across 9,976 random CAPE reports and 400 macOS Mirage runs in pre-rollout backtesting). Below are three examples you can inspect on VirusTotal.
1. Catching Zero- and Low-Detection In-the-Wild Lockers: The .k404 Campaign and lkd.exe
Static signatures often lag behind script-based or freshly compiled lockers. In an active .k404 extortion campaign submitted on November 17-18, Python locker fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354 (system_update.pyw) was flagged by 0 out of 75 static antivirus engines at the time of analysis, while companion PE binary 3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700 (K404T_Fidye.exe) had 10 / 75 detections and separate Windows locker a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087 (lkd.exe) had 3 / 75 at the time of analysis.
When detonated in Zenbox, system_update.pyw runs under pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\WindowsSystemUpdate\, self-deletes, and rewrites Desktop user files into .k404 ciphertext, while K404T_Fidye.exe and lkd.exe encrypt user documents in CAPE Sandbox using .k404 and .lkd extensions alongside k404t.txt and read_me_restore.txt ransom notes. In CAPE Sandbox, verified encryption sets both tag:encrypts-files and T1486. Note that Zenbox, macOS Mirage, and third-party sandboxes (such as Dr.Web vxCube or VMRay) keep their own rule-level T1486 mappings, so a file can carry T1486 from another sandbox rule without tag:encrypts-files.
2. Enterprise RaaS & High-Speed Windows Encryptors: INC Ransom and BlackWizardLock
Modern Windows ransomware families optimize encryption speed using asynchronous I/O and multi-threaded directory queues. In sample d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645 (INC Ransom), CAPE Sandbox captures the payload binding user files to Windows I/O Completion Ports (IOCP), rewriting user documents into .INC files, and dropping INC-README.txt across directories.
.INC extension.Similarly, sample 98110dedcca5803bc211f2d8dd640de79a2ba2a69d1def2f4970fa7799313f3e (BlackWizardLock) executes unpacked payload code from dynamically allocated memory, stages temporary .~BLWZ.tmp files, overwrites user documents with .BLWZ extensions (such as bitaddress.pdf.BLWZ and cover-letter-uidev.docx.BLWZ), and presents a full-screen Russian extortion lock screen that directs victims to @seedware on Telegram and threatens to destroy the Master Boot Record (MBR) after five wrong key attempts.
.BLWZ files.3. Native Apple Silicon macOS Ransomware: Heartbreaker (Historical macOS Sample Rescanned in macOS Mirage, 16 / 75 AV at Analysis)
While native macOS ransomware is rare in the wild compared to Windows, re-analyzing historical macOS samples validates Apple Silicon coverage. Sample 6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18 (first submitted in May 2025 and rescanned in macOS Mirage) is a self-signed 64-bit ARM64 Mach-O binary detected by 16 out of 75 antivirus engines at the time of analysis.
When detonated on bare-metal Apple Silicon in macOS Mirage, the binary installs a persistent LaunchAgent (/Users/admin/Library/LaunchAgents/com.network.startup.plist), drops /Users/admin/Desktop/README.txt, and encrypts user documents in /Users/admin/Downloads/ into Invoice_INV-2026-0842.pdf.heartbreaker and Vendor_Payment_Schedule.xlsx.heartbreaker. This triggers both ENCRYPTS_FILES and T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact).
Summary of Verified Public Samples
Every sample below is publicly available on VirusTotal and carries verified file-encryption behavioral telemetry across diverse file formats and ransomware families:
| Sample SHA-256 (Behavior Link) | Format | Static AV (at analysis) | Family / Threat Label | Verified Encryption Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fb0982bb9f5d5700685dcf4e99ff695f4593fbc3e3d0359d4c2baf23c545f354 | Python Script (python) |
0 / 75 | WindowsSystemUpdate (.k404) |
Zenbox-verified system_update.pyw encrypting Desktop files to .k404 with 0 static AV hits |
| c920140b725f44c223f33d13fd1f8646a9155d34b4b56a8a2bcd7e762a56c80c | Windows PE (peexe) |
1 / 75 | HotCrypt.exe (.aes) |
Zenbox-verified encryption of Desktop user documents to .aes, AES-256 ransom demand, and WindowsSecurityUpdater persistence |
| a8c2402ef3ae115300f5428712ccb0b5461f4a2f14b5bfdfbe08d5ad86bd3087 | Windows PE (peexe) |
3 / 75 | ransomware.bugbugo (lkd.exe) |
CAPE-verified encryption of user documents to .lkd and read_me_restore.txt drop |
| e38acc358eb0a8e44a5dfc8050f010ebcae1f00be11e7ab6ff82e159453fdbcb | Archive (zip) |
4 / 75 | K404T-Release.zip (.k404) |
Verified in both CAPE and Zenbox encrypting user documents to .k404 and dropping k404t.txt |
| 3dd45ab8e2f9c1af773a75221d792fb78870764419170e9c9c5941160364c700 | Windows PE (peexe) |
10 / 75 | K404T_Fidye.exe (.k404) |
Verified in both CAPE and Zenbox encrypting user documents to .k404 |
| cea1fb6c7f0c2a047e9a8e11c51bc29d43f16668df025da471b0aa0bc2428364 | Windows PE (peexe) |
31 / 75 | ransomware.medusa/amtb |
CAPE-verified encryption of user documents to .[A08D7447][Recovafiles@gmail.com].yuw |
| d243031985f7fa82a741e5677a227c65b2e2f1b07e0e10f00fe575dcc0eb4645 | Windows PE (peexe) |
36 / 75 | ransomware.incransom/incrnsm |
IOCP-queued encryption of user documents to .INC + INC-README.txt across drives |
| 98110dedcca5803bc211f2d8dd640de79a2ba2a69d1def2f4970fa7799313f3e | Windows PE (peexe) |
43 / 75 | trojan.blackwizard/encoder |
Stages .~BLWZ.tmp files, encrypts user documents to .BLWZ, and shows @seedware lock screen |
| 6bdf42a575d2daee3de2530161cb5b1fef6ca78b4abfa74f329d6b6c72890d18 | macOS ARM64 (macho) |
16 / 75 | trojan.abtrojan/amtb (Heartbreaker) |
May 2025 sample rescanned in macOS Mirage, encrypting user files in Downloads to .heartbreaker |
| 94b93a47e3e9e47e6daf5beee9007e90f9aaffb67598c3d18605620b284be08f | Windows DLL (pedll) |
59 / 75 | ransomware.lockbit/blackmatter |
LockBit 3.0 DLL (executed via DllMain) encrypting user documents and dropping 7danYRSZp.README.txt |
| eebbe14d40411a370cffd4d46a9451912e84cb3e80bfbe089466d5ae52a14b81 | Archive (rar) |
43 / 75 | trojan.wannacryptor/wannacry |
RAR-delivered WannaCry (wanacry.rar) encrypting user documents to .WNCRY in CAPE Sandbox |
What This Signal Does Not Catch
tag:encrypts-files is a high-precision confirmation signal, not an exhaustive recall filter. A missing tag does not mean a sample is benign or lacks ransomware logic. Automated sandbox runs will not emit the tag in several common scenarios:
- Samples that require command-line arguments or passwords: Affiliates often guard execution with a runtime flag (such as
LockBit 3.0builds that require-pass <key>to decrypt their payload). - Sandbox evasion, user-interaction gates, or long sleeps: Samples that exit on VM checks (
DETECT_DEBUG_ENVIRONMENT), stall past the analysis window (LONG_SLEEPS), or wait for specific locales or clicks never reach their encryption loop. - Unreachable command-and-control key servers: Families that fetch an encryption key from an offline C2 server before touching local files abort prior to file modification.
- DLLs with custom exported entry points: Standard rundll32 detonation executes
DllMain, which misses DLL lockers that require calling a specific named or ordinal export with structured arguments. - Network-share-only targets or executable file infectors: Samples configured to encrypt only SMB shares, niche database extensions absent from the VM, or parasitic
.exeinfectors (such asVirlockandNeshta) do not encrypt user documents on the local profile. - Safe ransomware simulators and analysis timeouts: Tools that only encrypt their own newly created test files rather than user documents, as well as samples that time out before reaching their encryption loop, do not trigger the tag.
Practical Security Use Cases & VirusTotal Intelligence Queries
Security teams can use tag:encrypts-files (or behaviour_tags:encrypts_files) immediately across VirusTotal Intelligence Search and the v3 REST API to streamline four common workflows:
- Building Clean Ransomware Validation Corpora for EDR and Storage Defense: Endpoint protection engineers, NAS/SAN storage security teams, and purple teams need fresh samples guaranteed to perform real disk-level file encryption when testing ransomware rollback and anomaly-detection sensors. Filter directly on samples verified to encrypt user documents across operating systems and architectures:
- All confirmed file-encrypting samples:
entity:file tag:encrypts-files - 64-bit Windows PE encryptors:
entity:file tag:encrypts-files type:peexe tag:64bits - Archive, script, and non-PE file encryptors:
entity:file tag:encrypts-files NOT type:peexe - macOS Mach-O encryptors (low in-the-wild volume):
entity:file tag:encrypts-files type:macho(note: 20 of the first 55 tagged files matchNOT type:peexe, mostly ZIP/RAR archives plus.pywscripts and DLLs)
- All confirmed file-encrypting samples:
- Uncovering Evasive or Newly Emerged Ransomware Families: Combine dynamic encryption proof with low static antivirus detection thresholds to catch novel packers, custom Go or Rust lockers, or targeted affiliate builds before broad signature coverage arrives:
- Low-detection file encryptors (< 10 AV detections):
entity:file tag:encrypts-files p:10-
- Low-detection file encryptors (< 10 AV detections):
- Rapid SOC Triage and Impact Prioritization: During incident response, seeing
behaviour_tags:cryptoon a suspicious binary only tells an analyst that cryptography libraries were linked or called. Seeingencrypts-filespaired withT1486confirms destructive file-encryption capability immediately, enabling faster containment and backup isolation decisions. - Confidential Detonation in Private Scanning: When triaging sensitive incident samples that cannot be uploaded to the public corpus, you can detonate them in Private Scanning to run the same CAPE, Zenbox, and macOS Mirage checks inside an isolated tenant.
Real-Time Hunting with VirusTotal Livehunt and YARA-X
Beyond retrospective search, you can receive real-time IOC Stream notifications whenever newly submitted or sandbox-analyzed files exhibit verified document encryption by pairing VirusTotal Livehunt with the vt YARA-X module.
1. Core Livehunt Rule: Verified ENCRYPTS_FILES Trait
The rule below matches any file whose sandbox behavior emits vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES. Because CAPE, Zenbox, and macOS Mirage only emit this trait after verifying user-document encryption, ANDing T1486 adds no extra precision:
import "vt"
rule HUNT_Ransomware_EncryptsFiles {
meta:
description = "Detects files verified to encrypt user documents in sandbox execution (ENCRYPTS_FILES trait)"
author = "Google Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-11-17"
reference = "https://docs.virustotal.com/docs/livehunt"
condition:
for any trait in vt.behaviour.traits : (
trait == vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES
)
}
2. Targeted Variant: Evasive / Low-Detection Ransomware Alerting
To focus your SOC or threat research feed strictly on emerging or lightly detected ransomware payloads (such as the 0/75 system_update.pyw script and 3/75 lkd.exe binary above), add a vt.metadata.analysis_stats.malicious threshold:
import "vt"
rule HUNT_Evasive_Ransomware_LowAV_EncryptsFiles {
meta:
description = "Alerts on low-detection files (< 10 AV engines) verified to encrypt user documents in sandboxes"
author = "Google Threat Intelligence"
date = "2026-11-17"
reference = "https://docs.virustotal.com/docs/livehunt"
condition:
vt.metadata.analysis_stats.malicious < 10 and
for any trait in vt.behaviour.traits : (
trait == vt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILES
)
}
Two practical tips when authoring Livehunt behavioral rules:
- Prefer
vt.behaviour.traitsovervt.metadata.tagsfor immediate behavioral matching: Livehunt evaluates dynamic rules as soon as sandbox reports finish (vt.behaviour.traits), so checkingvt.BehaviourTrait.ENCRYPTS_FILESmatches directly on the normalized sandbox report without waiting for downstream file-tag indexing. - When (if ever) to query T1486 in Livehunt: Do not AND T1486 onto ENCRYPTS_FILES rules, because vt.behaviour.mitre_attack_techniques aggregates across every sandbox (including broader Zenbox and third-party mappings) and adds no precision over the trait. Only add a case-insensitive
technique.id iequals "T1486"check in separate rules when you want broader T1486 hits from third-party sandboxes that do not emit ENCRYPTS_FILES.
Try It Out and Share Your Feedback
tag:encrypts-files (across CAPE Sandbox, Zenbox, and macOS Mirage) and stricter T1486 gating (in CAPE Sandbox) are live in production for newly scanned and re-analyzed files:
- Where the tag appears: Check the top file header badges or Behavior > Behavior Tags (
attributes.tagsandbehaviour_traitsin the v3 API). - Where triggering file paths are recorded: Inspect Signatures and File system actions > Files written in the Behavior tab (or
signature_matches[].match_datain/api/v3/files/{sha256}/behaviours) to see the specific affected file paths. - Evaluating older cached files: Cached reports from earlier scans keep their historical tags. Click Reanalyze in the VirusTotal web UI to queue dynamic runs on eligible sandboxes that have not yet analyzed that hash (
POST /api/v3/files/{id}/analysein the API refreshes static AV only unless the file is re-uploaded or detonated in Private Scanning).
To explore live matches right now, open VirusTotal Intelligence Search (entity:file tag:encrypts-files) or deploy the YARA rules above in VirusTotal Livehunt. If you spot an interesting sample, edge case, or feature request, please contact us.
Happy hunting!
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